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Author's Comments to Public Employee
Bargaining in California: The
Meyers-Milias-Brown Act in the Courts
by
JOSEPH GRODIN*
It is more than a quarter of a century since I wrote my piece on the
Meyers-Milias-Brown Act ("MMBA"),' and what is most surprising is
how little has changed. The situation is particularly remarkable in light
of sweeping changes that have occurred elsewhere in California public
sector labor relations law. In place of the antiquated Brown Act2
discussed in my article, we now have separate statutes governing labor
relations for state employees, 3 higher education employees,4 and
employees of local school boards,5 and all three statutes are
administered by a single agency, the Public Employment Relations
Board ("PERB"). 6 But so far as cities, counties, and special districts are
concerned, their labor relations remain governed by the MvIBA, a
statute which remains sketchy in its essential terms, and dependent
upon the courts for its interpretation and enforcement.
There have been a few amendments to the statute. While at the
time of my article the status of union security arrangements was unclear,
agency shop arrangements (requiring payment of a service fee to a
recognized employee organization as a condition of continued
* John F. Digardi Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California-
Hastings College of the Law; Associate Justice of the California Supreme Court, 1982-
1987.
1. See Joseph Grodin, Public Employee Bargaining in California, 23 HASTINGS L.J.
719 (1972). See generally CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3500-3511 (West 1995 & West Supp.
1999).
2. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 54950-54962 (West 1995 & West Supp. 1999).
3. See id. §§ 3512-3524.
4. See idt §3 3560-3599.
5. See id. §§ 3540-3549.3.
6. See id. § 3541.
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employment) are now explicitly authorized and regulated,7 and the right
of public employees to authorize dues deductions is confirmed.8 And,
the application of the statute to local court employees has been
clarified.9 But those are relatively minor changes given the passage of
time.
The fact that the MMBA has endured for so long without
significant change is attributable in major part to the work of the
courts.10 At the time I undertook the writing of my earlier article there
were no appellate decisions under the statute, and by the time I finished
there was only one." My research, of necessity, was based entirely
upon the decisions of trial courts, upon the statutory language and what
was known of its background, and upon certain parallels with the
National Labor Relations Act.12 Since then there have been well over
100 appellate decisions, including a dozen or so by the California
Supreme Court.13 While recognizing the implications of personal
immodesty implicit in the judgment, I would say that on the whole the
courts have done quite a good job in filling the statutory gaps.
14
It was obvious from the outset that the MMvBA was modeled to
considerable extent after the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"),
and the courts have frequently resorted to that statute and its
interpretations as a guide with respect to many of the issues that have
arisen.' 5 This is true, for example, with respect to the duty to "meet and
7. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3502.5 (added in 1981).
8. See id. § 3508.5 (added in 1981).
9. See it § 3501.5 (added in 1988). Section 3501.5 provides generally that employees
of superior or municipal courts are "public employees" of the county, entitled to
representation under the statute. Id.
10. Credit is also shared by representatives of public entities and employee organizations,
whose cooperation has resolved many problems that might otherwise have been subject to
litigation.
11. See Joseph Grodin, California Public Employee Bargaining Revisited: The MMB Act
in the Appellate Courts, 21 CAL. PUB. EMPLOYEE REL. 2 (1974) (updating my first article with
appellate decisions issued since its original publication).
12. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1511-1699 (1994).
13. See generally CAL PUB. EMPLOYEE RELATIONS, UNIV. OF CAL. AT BERKELEY,
POCKET GUIDE TO THE MEYERS-MILIAS-BROWN Acr (1985).
14. Actually, I had few occasions on the bench to deal with the MMBA. My immodesty
derives from the fact that the courts have frequently relied upon my earlier article in their
analysis of the statute.
15. For example, in its first case under the MMBA, the California Supreme Court
observed: "Federal labor relation legislation has, of course, frequently been the prototype for
California labor enactments, and, accordingly, in the past we have often looked to federal law
for guidance in interpreting state provisions whose language parallels that of the federal
statutes." Social Workers' Union, Local 535 v. Alameda County Welfare Dep't, 521 P.2d 453,
459 (Cal. 1974).
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confer,"1 6 which is initially defined in section 3505 of the MMBA in
even broader terms than the scope of bargaining under the NLRA.
17
The last part of section 3504, however, excepts from the scope of
representation "consideration of the merits, necessity, or organization
of any service or activity provided by law or executive order. ' 18 In Fire
Fighters Union, Local 1186 v. City of Vallejo,19 the city relied upon that
language to argue that the staffing levels at firehouses were not within
the scope of bargaining; but the California Supreme Court applied
federal precedent by analogy to hold that a city was required to bargain
over staffing levels and personnel reduction to the extent they affected
workload and safety.20
Similarly, in Building Material & Construction Teamsters' Union,
Local 216 v. Farrell,21 the California Supreme Court followed NLRA
precedent to hold that it was unlawful for an employer to take unilateral
action with respect to a bargainable subject, absent a "clear and
16. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3505 (West 1995).
17. Under federal law, the scope of bargaining is defined as "wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment." 29 U.S.C. 158(d) (1994). In the MMBA, this language
is preceded by the phrase "including, but not limited to." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3504. In
Social Workers' Union, the court, referring to the suggestion in my original article that this
phrasing suggests the scope of bargaining might be even broader under the MIvMBA, stated:
"[T]hus, while the federal authorities undoubtedly provide a useful starting point in
interpreting the scope of our state provision, they do not necessarily establish the limits of
California public employees' representational rights." 521 P.2d at 459.
18. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3504.
19. 526 P.2d 971 (Cal. 1974).
20. See iL at 978-80. The question in City of Vallejo was whether disputes over staffing
levels and reductions in force were subject to the interest arbitration procedure established by
the city's charter, but the court found that the scope of arbitration under the charter was
identical to the scope of representation under the Act. See id. at 977. See also Los Angeles
County. Civil. Serv. Comm'n v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 588 P.2d 249 (Cal. 1978)
(holding, in line with federal precedent, that a county civil service commission had a duty to
bargain over layoff procedures, thought not the layoff itself).
Since City of Vallejo, lower courts have held that a local entity has a duty to bargain
over such matters as: wages for employees participating in volunteer work, see American
Fed'n of State, County, Mun. Employees, Local 101 v. City of Santa Clara, 160 Cal. App.
3d 1006, (1984); assignment of overtime work, see Dublin Prof'l Firefighters v. Valley
Community Serv. Dist., 45 Cal. App. 3d 116 (1975); drug testing, see Holliday v. City of
Modesto, 229 Cal. App. 3d 528 (1991); shift changes, see Indep. Union of Serv. Employees
v. County of Sacramento, 147 Cal. App. 3d 482 (1983); employee parking fees, see Los
Angeles Police Protective League v.City of Los Angeles, 166 Cal. App. 3d 55 (1985);
safety rules, including policy on motorcycle use, see Solano Co. Employees Ass'n v.
County of Solano, 136 Cal. App. 3d 62 (1982); and the adoption of a rule prohibiting
personal use of city facilities, see Vernon Fire Fighters v. City of Vernon, 107 Cal. App. 3d
802 (1980).
21. 715 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1986).
April 1999]
HeinOnline -- 50 Hastings L.J. 763 1998-1999
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
unmistakable" waiver by the union of the right to bargain. 22 Federal
precedent has also played a primary role in cases holding that a
Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") negotiated under the
MMBA and adopted by the governing body of the public entity is a
binding contract;23 that individual employees have a right to union
representation at even informal disciplinary proceedings;24 and that
arbitration is a permissible mode of resolving grievances, including in
disputes over employee discipline 25
Issues involving bargaining units and recognition of unions have
not given rise to as much appellate litigation as might have been
predicted, given the lack of a statewide administrative agency to
decide such matters, but the fact that some large cities and counties
have developed their own agencies to deal with such issues has no
doubt relieved much of the pressure. While the relationship between
local rules governing such matters and the MMBA was debatable at
the time of my earlier article, the California Supreme Court has since
made clear that local rules may not conflict with the requirements of
the statute.
26
22. Id. at 658.
23. See Glendale City Employees' Ass'n v. City of Glendale, 540 P.2d 609,615 (Cal. 1975).
24. See Civil Service Ass'n, Local 400 v. City and County of San Francisco, 586 P2d 162,
171 (Cal. 1978); see also Social Workers' Union, Local 535 v. Alameda County Welfare Dep't,
521 P.2d 453,456 (Cal. 1974) (holding that an employee has a right to union representation at
an interview that the employee believes involves union activity and reasonably anticipates
may lead to discipline).
25. See Taylor v. Crane, 595 P.2d 129, 136 (Cal. 1979). Courts have continued to follow
federal precedent in connection with enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate, see e.g., Serv.
Employees Union Local 347 v. City of Los Angeles, 42 Cal. App. 4!h 1546 (1996) (dispute over
whether the city's premium pay ordinance applied to union members was arbitrable issue);
and in connection with the enforcement of arbitration awards, see eg., Social Servs. Union v.
Alameda County Training and Employment Bd., 207 Cal. App. 3d 1458 (1989) (arbitrator did
not exceed his authority when he ordered the agency to promote a public employee as a
remedy for violation of the MOU).
26. "The extent of local government powers under the act was a subject of early dispute,
spurred by language in the preamble which, if read literally, might have suggested that the
statute was not intended to be binding on local governments that chose to adopt rules and
regulations contrary to its provisions." [citing the principal article at pp. 723-725]. However, as
Professor (now Justice) Grodin explained, 'Such an interpretation is inconsistent with the
general objectives of the statute as declared [elsewhere] in the preamble and with the
mandatory language which appears in many of the sections. [citing the principal article].
Accordingly, it is now well settled that the Legislature intended that the MMBA 'set forth
reasonable, proper and necessary principles which public agencies must follow in their rules
and regulations for administering their employer-employee relations ... ' and that 'if the rules
and regulations of a public agency do not meet the standard established by the Legislature, the
deficiencies of those rules and regulations as to rights, dues and obligations of the employer,
the employee, and employee organization, are supplied by the appropriate provisions of the
act .... ." International Bhd. of Electrical Workers v. City of Gridley, 666 P.2d 960 (Cal. 1983).
[Vol. 50
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Public entities have not generally been inclined to resist
unionization in the way that private employers often do, a fact which
may help explain why unions have made such headway in organizing
public employees during a period in which organization in the private
sector has declined. Consequently, there are few reported cases
involving discrimination against individuals for union membership or
activity.27 There are, however, several cases in which public entities
have been found to have engaged in group discrimination by treating
employees represented by a union, or by a particular union, less
favorably than other employees.28
All of this case law followed, more or less closely, federal
precedent. It soon became apparent, however, that the private sector
labor law model could not answer all the questions raised by the
transplantation of collective bargaining to the public sector. For one
thing, the public sector came to the bargaining process carrying a
baggage of customs, institutions, and expectations that were to some
extent resistant to total transplantation. There were the civil service
systems, which came into being as a means of avoiding political
favoritism, but which over time had established hegemony over nearly
all aspects of the employment relationship. There were the civil service
associations accustomed to representing public employees at all levels-
from rank-and-file to top management-through the political process
rather than through any sort of collective bargaining. And there was
the tradition, backed to some extent by law, that strikes in the public
sector were not acceptable-a tradition which public sector unions
regarded as reducing the negotiation process to "collective begging."
Moreover, underlying this more or less malleable divergence in
customs and traditions between the private and public sectors there
exists a core of unmodifiable distinction: the public sector is governed
by a political process ultimately responsible to the electorate. That fact
does not diminish the appropriateness of collective bargaining in the
public sector,29 but it does unavoidably play a role in structuring the
27. Santa Clara Counsel Attorneys Ass'n v. Woodside, 869 P.2d 1142 (Cal. 1994), was such
a case, but the facts were unusual; at issue was the right of a deputy county counsel to sue the
county under the MMBA.
28. Campbell Mun. Employees Ass'n v. City of Campbell, 131 Cal. App. 3d 416 (1982)
(per Grodin, J., holding that the City Council had discriminated against plaintiff organization
and its members by fixing retroactivity of wage increases at a date less favorable than that
fixed for other employees); Los Angeles County Employees Ass'n v. County of Los Angeles,
168 Cal. App. 3d 683 (1985) (similar); San Leandro Police Officers Ass'n v. City of San
Leandro, 55 Cal. App. 3d 553 (1976) (granting of incentive benefits to nonunion employees
and not to union employees constituted unlawful discrimination).
29. Cf. Harry H. Wellington & Ralph K. Winter, Jr., The Limits of Collective Bargaining
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bilateral process of collective bargaining to accommodate the
requirements of polity.
Some of these tensions came to the supreme court's attention in
Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission v. Superior Court of Los
Angeles.30 The Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission, after a
public hearing at which union representatives were allowed to speak,
but without bargaining with the unions, adopted certain amendments to
rules concerning layoffs and reductions in lieu of layoff.31  The
Commission defended its refusal to bargain with the unions on the
ground that the MMBA reflects a legislative determination to exempt
counties with civil service systems from its meet-and-confer
requirements,32 and on the ground that the county charter directs the
Commission to prescribe, amend, and enforce rules for the classified
service on the basis of a public hearing.33 The court, after concluding
that the Legislature did not intend to exempt civil service counties from
the requirements of the statute,34 held that the public hearing provision
of the county charter was not incompatible with the statutory
requirement to meet and confer on a bilateral basis, and that the
commission could bargain with the unions and hold a public hearing as
well.35 In light of that ruling, it was not necessary for the court to decide
whether the MMBA could override conflicting provisions of a county
charter.
Similar but more dramatic confrontations between the
bargaining process and the political process are posed when an issue
concerning matters within the scope of MMBA bargaining are
presented to the electorate in the form of an initiative or referendum.
The Supreme Court has held that a city has a duty under the MMBA
to bargain with a recognized union over whether the city should
submit to voters charter amendments pertaining to matters within the
scope of bargaining.36  It has also recognized that if collective
in Public Employment, YALE LJ. 1107 (1969), arguing that the importation of collective
bargaining into the public sector, when added to political access, would unduly enhance the
power of unions. The argument assumes that governing bodies and their constituencies will
be pushovers for union pressure, an argument that has not withstood the test of time.
30. 588 P.2d 249 (Cal. 1978).
31. See id. at 251.
32. See id. at 254.
33. See id. at 254-55.
34. See id. at 253.
35. See id. at 255.
36. See People ex rel Seal Beach Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Seal Beach, 685 P.2d
1145, 1152 (Cal. 1984). In Fresno v. People ex rel. Fresno Firefighters, 71 Cal. App. 4th 82
(1999), the Court of Appeal for the Fifth District recently held that a charter provision which
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50
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bargaining is to be meaningful in the public sector, a voter
referendum may not be used to block a county ordinance
implementing a MOU. 37
The political nature of the public sector may also justify
consideration of public policy limitations on the scope of bargaining.
Lower courts have read into the scope of bargaining under the
MMIBA an exemption for "fundamental policy decisions", holding
that a city need not bargain over a change of policy concerning the
use of deadly force by its police in situations in which a life as at
stake38 or over a decision to allow a member of the citizen's police
review commission to attend police department hearings regarding
citizen complaints against police and to send a member of the
department review commission meetings.39 The Supreme Court has
cited these cases with apparent approval, but distinguished them from
a decision to transfer positions from one bargaining unit to another
for reasons of economy and efficiency on the ground that "[d]ecisions
involving the betterment of police-community relations and the
avoidance of unnecessary deadly force are of obvious importance,
and directly affect the quality and nature of public services. '40
Possibly the most important issue to confront the courts under
the MMIBA concerned the statute's impact upon the right to strike.
There had been suggestions in the lower courts prior to the MMBA
that as a matter of common law public employees could not strike,
but those decisions seemed to rest upon the premise that collective
bargaining was inappropriate for the public sector. The MIMBA
set forth criteria for calculating minimum salary levels was not a matter within the scope of
representation, and that the city was not required to bargain over its repeal. The court
distinguished the provision under consideration from a charter provision setting salary. Judge
Ardaiz dissented, arguing forcefully (and persuasively) that the distinction was without merit.
37. See Voters for Responsible Retirement v. Bd. of Supervisors of Trinity County, 884
P.2d 645, 652 (Cal. 1994). The court's holding was limited to the use of a referendum to block
a county ordinance, and on that ground the court found it unnecessary to consider United Pub.
Employees, Local 390/400 v. City and County of San Francisco, 235 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Ct. App.
1987). The United Pub. Employees court held that a charter provision requiring that all
increases in employee benefits be subject to voter approval was compatible with the MMBA.
See id. at 481. The Responsible Retirement court did observe, however, that "the decision
understated the problematic nature of the relationship between the MMBA and local
referendum power .... If the bargaining process and ultimate ratification of the fruits of this
dispute resolution procedure by the governing body is to have its purpose fulfilled, then the
decision of the governing body to approve the MOU must be binding and not subject to the
uncertainty of referendum." Id. at 655.
38. San Jose Peace Officers' Ass'n v. City of San Jose, 78 Cal. App. 3d 935 (1978).
39. Berkeley Police Ass'n v. City of Berkeley, 76 Cal. App. 3d 931 (1977).
40. 715 P.2d at 655.
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reversed that premise but was silent on the right to strike, most likely
because the Legislature found that issue politically too hot to handle.
When the issue came to the California Supreme Court in County
Sanitation District No. 2 of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles County
Employees Ass'n, Local 660,41 the court examined the various
alternative arguments for denying public employees the right to strike
even within a collective bargaining regime, and found them lacking in
persuasive force.42 The one argument the court found to have partial
merit was the necessity for protecting public health and safety,43 but
that argument was obviously overly broad as applied to all public
employees. Confronting the question as a matter of statutory
interpretation, the court held that under the MMBA a strike by
public employees to improve wages and working conditions is not
unlawful unless it poses an "imminent threat to public health or
safety."44
There are a number of issues under the MMBA which remain in
need of clarification. For example, it seems to be unclear whether a
union which represents employees in a defined bargaining unit on an
exclusive basis has a duty to represent them fairly and without
discrimination,45 even though such an obligation would seem to
follow from the analogy of federal precedent and its underlying
reasoning. 46 Along similar lines, there appears to be some question as
to the scope of a union's authority to bind employees within a
bargaining unit to an agreement which waives or modified pre-
41. 699 P.2d 835 (Cal. 1985).
42. See id. at 846.
43. See id. at 849.
44. Id. at 854. Subsequently, the court held that a strike, even if illegal under County
Sanitation, is not a tort for which damages may be awarded. See City and County of San
Francisco v. Plumbers Union Local No. 38, 726 P.2d 538 (1986). The Court of Appeal has
held, following County Sanitation, that work stoppages by police are illegal even without
specific proof of imminent threat to public health or safety. City of Santa Ana v. Santa Ana
Police Benevolent Ass'n., 207 Cal. App. 3d 1568 (1989).
45. Andrews v. Bd. of Supervisors, 134 Cal. App. 3d 274 (1982), (suggesting that no duty
of fair representation exists under the MMBA because its terms permit employees to
represent themselves). Compare with Lane v. Stationary Eng'rs Local 39,212 Cal. App. 3d 164
(1989), (holding that a union owes its members a duty of fair representation, defined in
accordance with federal principles, on the basis of the contractual relationship between a
union and its members).
46. See Winograd, California Public Employees and the Developing Duty of Fair
Representation, 9 INDUS. REL. LJ. 410, 413-14 (1987). The Court of Appeal has held, in
accordance with federal precedent, that the MMBA does not contemplate individual
bargaining in the face of exclusive recognition. Relyea v. Ventura County Fire Protection
Dist., 2 Cal. App. 4th 875 (1992).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50
HeinOnline -- 50 Hastings L.J. 768 1998-1999
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE BARGAINING
existing contractual rights.47 And, question exists with respect to the
right of a public entity, once a bargaining impasse has been reached,
to impose a solution that defers its obligation to bargain for extended
periods of time.48
These are questions which presumably will be resolved in the due
course of litigation, but they are examples of the sort of question which,
in the federal arena and under the statutes subject to PERB jurisdiction,
would be addressed in the first instance by an administrative agency
that has some background and experience in dealing with labor
relations matters. The continued lack of administrative guidance
remains a problem under the MMBA, as does the cost and time
entailed in litigation. For a union with scarce resources (or, for that
matter a public entity with scarce resources) the lack of an expeditious
method of resolving disputes arising out of the statute represents a
substantial impediment to the effectuation of its policies. There have
been proposals, in recent years, to bring PERB and its facilities into
administration of the MMBA, and it is about time they were acted
upon.
47. In San Bernardino Public Employees Ass'n v. City of Fontana, 67 Cal. App. 4th 1215
(1998) an employee organization which negotiated an agreement that relinquished certain
rights established by prior agreements in return for a wage increase then sued the city
contending that the rights it agreed to relinquish (personal leave accrual, longevity pay, and
retirement health benefits) were "fundamental vested rights" that could not be bargained
away through the collective bargaining process. The Court of Appeal concluded that personal
leave and longevity pay benefits are "simply terms and conditions of employment subject to
negotiation in the collective bargaining process," and that the issue with respect to retirement
health benefits was not ripe for review. The opinion makes no reference to the duty of fair
representation, and its relationship to the concept of "fundamental vested rights."
48. The Supreme Court ordered unpublished a decision of the Court of Appeal, reported
at 1661 L.R.R.M. 2889, upholding a city's imposition of an MOU for a period of two and a half
years.
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